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PREFACE 
In this experimental study a game theoretic environment is generated and voters‟ 
behavior under plurality rule is analyzed. Voters are given preference relations over a 
set of alternatives and are asked to express their choice in an election. At the end of 
each election results are announced and the voters are asked to vote again. It‟s been 
theoretically proved by Sertel and Sanver (2004) that, if voters could coordinate and 
collaborate, the equilibrium outcome of any voting game is generalized Condorcet 
winners. It has been checked in this experimental study if the repeated elections are a 
tool for coordination between voters and if the outcomes are generalized Condorcet 
winners. It‟s been further checked if the profile specification and electorate size has 
an effect on equilibrium outcomes and the number of repeated elections. 
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SUMMARY 
 
COORDINATION THROUGH REPEATED ELECTIONS: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
Anıl YILDIZPARLAK 
 
In this study the results of an experiment where voters' behavior, tested under 
Plurality rule, is presented. A social choice problem with three alternatives over 
which voters have preferences induced through monetary payoffs is considered. 
Each voter knows the payoff he gets from the best and worst alternatives while 
the amount assigned to the second best is unknown, except for its being between 
the amounts of the first and third bests. We thus obtain profiles of ordinal 
preferences over alternatives. For a given preference profile, elections are 
repeated by announcing the results after each round. For three distinct 
treatments the number of convergences; the relation between electorate size and 
number of convergences; and the relation between treatment and number of 
repeated elections are investigated. The number of convergences is higher in the 
treatments with a Condorcet winner compared to the profiles without a 
Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives. According to the experiment results 
there seems no difference for the number of convergences between groups with 
twenty one participants and groups with seven participants; however there is 
evidence that number of elections is higher for groups with twenty one 
participants.  Given the results of Sertel and Sanver (2004) which establish 
equivalence between Condorcet winners and strong equilibrium outcomes of 
voting games under various social choice rules, we are able to conclude that for 
a relatively small electorate, repeated elections and publicly announced election 
results can serve as a coordination device between voters. 
 
 
Keywords: Voting Experiments, Strong Nash Equilibrium. 
Science Code: JEL D72, C92. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
TEKRARLANAN SEÇİMLER İLE KOORDİNASYON: DENEYSEL BİR 
ÇALIŞMA 
 
 
Anıl YILDIZPARLAK 
 
Bu çalışmada seçmenlerin çoğunluk seçimi kuralı altındaki oy verme 
davranışları sunulmuştur. Seçmenlere maddi kazanç verilerek tercihlerinin 
oluşturulduğu üç adaylı bir sosyal tercih problemi tasarlanmıştır. Her seçmen 
en üst ve en alt tercihinin seçilmesi karşılığında alacağı kazancın bilgisine sahip 
olmakla beraber aradaki tercihinin seçilmesi durumundaki kazancının değeri 
ile ilgili olarak sadece, bu kazancın en üst ve en alt kazancı arasında eşit 
olasılıklı olduğu bilgisine sahiptir. Bu şekilde sıralı tercihler elde edilmiş 
olmaktadır. Verilmiş bir tercih profiline göre seçimler yapılmakta seçim 
sonuçları açıklanarak seçim tekrar edilmektedir. Üç ayrı uygulamaya göre 
yakınsama sayıları; seçmen büyüklüğü ile yakınsama sayıları arasındaki ilişki; 
uygulamanın içeriği ile tekrarlanan seçim sayısı arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. 
Verilen bir profile göre, adaylar kümesinde bir Condorcet kazananı bulunan 
uygulamalarda yakınsama sayısının Condorcet kazananı olmayan uygulamaya 
göre daha fazla olduğu görülmüştür. Deney sonuçlarına göre yirmi bir kişilik 
seçmen topluluklarında gözlemlenen tekrarlanan seçim sayısının yedi kişilik 
seçmen grupları için gözlemlenen tekrarlanan seçim sayısından daha fazla 
olduğu tespit edilirken, yakınsama sayısında yedi kişilik seçmen grupları ile 
yirmi bir kişilik seçmen grupları arasında bir farklılık gözlemlenmemiştir.  
Condorcet kazananları ve güçlü Nash dengesi kazananları arasında özdeşlik 
olduğu sonucundan yola çıkarak (Sertel ve Sanver, 2004), görece küçük bir 
topluluk için sonuçları kamuoyuna açıklanan tekrarlanan seçimlerin seçmenler 
arasında bir koordinasyon aracı olarak işlev gördüğü söylenilebilir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Oy Verme Deneyleri, Güçlü Nash Dengesi. 
Bilim Dalı Sayısal Kodu: JEL D72, C92 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a variety of experimental research on voting and voting behavior of 
agents. In some of these experiments authors tested if the proper voting equilibria, 
established by Myerson and Weber (1989), could be reached via repeated elections 
or via the usage of election polls. Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz and Weber (1996) 
reported the frequency of the Condorcet loser losing an election. In these terms, these 
elections mostly focused on the Borda‟s concern about the outcome of an election, 
which Gehrlein (2006) interprets as, electing the pairwise majority rule winner 
(PMRW) is important, but not to elect pairwise majority rule loser (PMRL) is the 
crucial point. 
In this experiment the strong Nash equilibria of the normal form voting game 
induced by any voting rule is in focus. Sertel and Sanver (2004) proved that the 
strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting games determined by social choice 
functions with certain characteristics, turn out to be nothing but generalized 
Condorcet winners, namely the „„(𝑛, 𝑞) - Condorcet winners” where n stands for the 
electorate size and q, which will be explained in proceeding sections, for the critical 
number. Sertel and Sanver (2004) also showed that classical Condorcet winners 
coincide with the generalized Condorcet winners in the games induced by 
anonymous and top-majoritarian voting rules.  
We consider a voting game in which players are given preference relations over a set 
of alternatives, namely the candidates. Therefore each agent has a transitive and 
binary relation over this set of alternatives. Strong equilibrium is the Nash 
equilibrium when agents are free to collaborate and coordinate. In the setting used it 
is considered that these coalitions will eventually arise in repeated elections if each 
election result made public. Rietz (2003) reports from various experimental analyses 
that the agents were aware of the Condorcet loser problem and voted strategically to 
avoid it. Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz and Weber (1996) experimentally discovered that 
that repeated elections abetted in avoiding the problem of electing the Condorcet 
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Loser in an election not only according to plurality rule but also in approval voting 
and Borda count. Blais, Laslier Laurent, Sauger and Straeten (2007) also established 
that repeated elections act as a signaling device between voters and voters behaved in 
a way to allow Cox‟s interpretation of Duverger‟s law to evolve. This results show 
that the voters could use the information given by repeated elections, and coordinate 
in a way to avoid undesired outcomes.  
A spectacular example in coordination and the outcome of strong equilibrium is 
given by Lakeman and Lambert (1959) and quoted by Sertel and Sanver (2004). It 
illustrates the way the agents coordinate and also establishes a mainframe for the 
experimental design:  
„„Rowland Hill … records that, when he was teaching in his father‟s school, his 
pupils were asked to elect a committee by standing beside the boy they liked best. 
This first produced a number of unequal groups, but soon the boys in the largest 
groups came to the conclusion that not all of them were actually necessary for the 
election of their favorite and some moved on to help another candidate, while on the 
other hand a few supporters of an unpopular boy gave him up as hopeless and 
transferred themselves to the candidate they considered the next best. The final result 
was that a number of candidates equal to the number required for the committee were 
each surrounded by the same number of supporters, with only two or three boys left 
over who were dissatisfied with all those elected.‟‟ 
In real life situations, it is very unlikely for agents to collaborate before the election 
due to large masses of voter groups and diversity of preference relations. That‟s why 
in a large electorate coordination becomes harder and it may be unlikely to observe 
strong equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, it is also investigated in the experiment if 
the strong equilibrium outcomes could be reached with a larger electorate.  
The basic motivation for this experimental study is if repeated elections could serve 
as a coordination device for the strong equilibrium outcomes to be elected. The 
former motivation is to identify if the voting behavior changes when there‟s no 
Condorcet winner according to the preference profile given. The last motivation for 
this experimental study is to detect if the voting equilibrium changes when the 
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electorate size is differentiated. It is further investigated if the sequence to end 
election changes with different electorate size and treatment.     
In section two; a brief introduction is given for the Social Choice Theory; in section 
three, some universally accepted and practically used voting rules and our main focus 
Plurality rule are defined; in section four, the basic assumptions and the environment 
of the voting game are explained. In section five, the notion of generalized Condorcet 
winners and beta effectivity are given. In section six, the experimental designed is 
illustrated and section seven includes the results of the experiment; and finally in 
section eight suggestions for further research are given. 
2. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 
Social Choice Theory is the theory of aggregating individual preferences, which have 
social impacts such a way that from a group of alternatives one or more alternatives 
is (are) selected from that group to be Social Preferences of a group of people. Many 
of situations can be presented as an example of a “Social Choice”. For a very small 
society, like a family, the decision for where to go out at the weekend for example is 
choice in which every member has a preference over a set of alternative; namely 
going to a park, to a movie, to a mall, etc. For a large society, like a nation, this 
decision could be the selection of a person or a group to rule the country. The social 
decision could be reached by any means of aggregators, for a dictatorial ruling this 
decision is the decision of a single agent no matter how large the society is, for 
oligarchy the decision is the aggregation of a sub-group in the society. For example 
in a family, if the children are too small they are rarely allowed to present 
preferences or they are not regarded as decisive, so that kind of family is a good 
example of oligarchy. In a democratic society the decision over a set of alternatives 
are often reached by aggregation of individual preference of every member of a 
society who is regarded as a rational individual, by using some means of voting. In 
the following sub-sections, the theory is presented formally. 
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2.1 Individual preferences and Social Choice Functions 
The theory presented in this section is based on Riker (1982). Let set 𝑋 =  𝑥, 𝑦, …  
be a finite set of alternatives. The alternatives could be anything that has an impact 
on a society no matter how large or small it is and let 𝑁 =  1,2, … , 𝑛  be the set of 
members in a society. Notice that the  𝑁 ≥ 2 for the decision to be “Social”. It is 
pre-assumed that all members of 𝑁 are rational and has rational preferences over the 
set of alternatives (Mas-Colell, 1995). Formally, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 there exists a 
preference relation over the set of alternatives 𝑋. For each member in the set of 
members, there exists an asymmetric binary relation 𝑃𝑖 ∶ 𝑋 ×  𝑋, written as 𝑥 𝑃𝑖𝑦 or 
𝑦𝑃𝑖𝑥 (but not both), and means x is strictly preferred to y or y is strictly preferred to 
x. The 𝑃𝑖  relation can be regarded as the strict counterpart of the relation 𝑅𝑖 . 
Furthermore, for each member of 𝑁 there exists a symmetric binary relation 𝐼𝑖 ∶ 𝑋 ×
𝑋 where 𝑥 𝐼𝑖  𝑦 implies 𝑦 𝐼 𝑖 𝑥, which could be regarded as the indifference 
counterpart of the relation. Together 𝑃𝑖  and 𝐼𝑖  constitutes the preference relation 𝑅𝑖 ∶
𝑋 × 𝑋. Notice that 𝑅𝑖  is complete, therefore either or both 𝑥 𝑅𝑖𝑦 or 𝑦𝑅𝑖𝑥 could hold. 
Moreover a further assumption must be made about preference relation in order to 
make a social decision over the set of alternatives. This assumption is transitivity of 
individual preferences. According to the transitivity assumption individual 
preferences cannot be cyclic. One could not consider individual rationality of any 
individual without transitivity assumption. The preference relation 𝑅𝑖  is transitive if 
and only if 𝑥 𝑅𝑖𝑦 and 𝑦𝑅𝑖𝑧 implies 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑧, ∀ 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋. The composition of 
preference relation of all agents is called a preference profile 𝑅 where ∀ 𝑅𝑖 ∈ 𝑅. 
Furthermore, the set of all possible preference profiles over the set of alternatives 
confronting the set of voters are denoted as 𝑊𝑁 . For simplification a preference of a 
generic voter who prefers x to y and y to z will be denoted as follows, and will be 
used throughout the paper: 
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x 
y 
z 
 
Let 𝐹: 𝑊𝑁 → 𝑋 be a social choice function that maps from a particular profile 𝑅 ∈
 𝑊𝑁and to 𝑋. The outcome of the function 𝐹 𝑋, 𝑅  is the social choice of the society. 
Notice that the outcome of 𝐹could be in any cardinality. It could be a singleton-
valued function which elects exactly one alternative from the set of alternatives, or it 
could select a subset of 𝑋. The election of members in a committee constitutes a 
good example of a multi-alternative selecting social choice function.  
As an example to a rule that affects the social choice function, a situation under 
dictatorship is presented below (Mas-Colell, 1995). Let 𝑋 = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} and let 𝑁 =
 1,2, … , 𝑛 . There exists one agent 𝑗 in the electorate who is called a dictator. Every 
member in 𝑁 has a preference 𝑅𝑖  on the set of alternatives. Then the social outcome 
operates according to the rule of dictatorship is: 
 
𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧;  𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑗 … , 𝑅𝑛 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑗  
 
So the social choice according to dictatorship is the preference of the dictator 𝑗 no 
matter what 𝑅 − {𝑅𝑗 } are.   
Though, in a democratic society the rule of aggregating individual preferences is 
called voting. Many voting rules are suggested and used for decades; however they 
all suffer from one weakness: They include at least one violation of the axioms. This 
result is driven from General Possibility Theorem Arrow (1951) and quoted by Riker 
(1982). Arrow proves that even under widely accepted notions of fairness no Social 
Choice rule could amalgamate the preferences of voters but one: Dictatorship. In the 
next session some important axioms of the theory are be explained formally and the 
voting rules are presented briefly. 
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2.2 Some Important Axioms of Social Choice Functions   
The axioms presented there are mostly introduced by Arrow (1951); and quoted by 
Riker (1982) which he calls as “Conditions of Fairness” and Mas-Colell (1995).   
2.2.1 Universal Admissibility of individual orderings 
This condition states that the voters cannot be prohibited from choosing any 
preference relation from all possible orderings of alternatives. So, formally any 
specific subset of 𝑊𝑁  cannot be excluded from 𝑊𝑁 . This condition constitutes the 
basic for democratic thought. If one or more preference relation is excluded so that 
the voters are not given chance to select that preference would mean a violation of 
this condition. Riker (1982) states that “Any rule or command that prohibits a person 
from choosing some preference order is morally unacceptable (or at least unfair) 
from the point of view of democracy” 
2.2.2 Monotonicity 
This condition requires that if a supporter of a non-winning candidate changes its 
preference favoring the winning candidate, the winning candidate cannot become a 
loser as an outcome of the social choice function. The reverse should also hold for 
the existence of (weak) monotonicity: If a supporter of a non-winning candidate 
changes its preference favoring the winning candidate, the non-winning candidate 
cannot become the winner of the election. 
2.2.3 Citizen’s sovereignty (Nonimposition) 
This condition implies that for every alternative 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 there exists at least one 
preference profile 𝑅 ⊂  𝑊𝑁  that selects that alternative. A weaker form of citizen‟s 
sovereignty which is quoted from Arrow (1951) by Riker (1982), implies that the 
social choice function should not produce the same outcome no matter what the 
preference profile is, otherwise “the democratic participation is meaningless” (Riker, 
1982).  
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2.2.4 Top-Unanimity 
This requirement simply implies that if, members unanimously prefers x to y then the 
outcome of the social function should be x. Formally; let {𝑥} = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑖  ∀ 𝑖 ∈
𝑁, then the social choice function is top-unanimous if and only 
if  𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, … ; 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑛 = 𝑥.  
 
2.2.5 Independence of irrelevant alternatives (Pairwise independence)  
This requirement suggests that if we have two distinct preference profiles and in 
these profiles every member of the society has the same preference over two specific 
alternatives, moreover one of the alternatives is the winner according to the social 
choice function in one of these profiles, and it must be the winner in the second also. 
If we can denote this condition formally also: 
Let 𝑅𝑖  ∈  𝑅 and 𝑅𝑖
′  ∈  𝑅′ be two distinct preference profiles,  𝑥, 𝑦 ⊂ 𝑋 and let 
𝐹: 𝑅 → 𝑋 be the social choice function. Furthermore, assume that ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,  𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ∶
𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑥 𝑅𝑖 ′ 𝑦} and   𝑖: 𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑥 = {𝑖: 𝑦 𝑅𝑖
′  𝑥}, then the social choice 
function is independent of irrelevant alternatives if and only 
if 𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, … ; 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑛 = 𝐹 𝑥, 𝑦, … ; 𝑅1′, 𝑅2′, … , 𝑅𝑛 ′ . 
There exist other crucially important conditions of fairness beyond the introduced 
ones in the General Possibility Theorem. Riker (1982) states these conditions as 
follows: 
2.2.6 Anonymity 
This condition requires that if we reassign preference relations of voters, the social 
choice function should give the same result. The basic motivation for this condition 
is that, it guarantees that voters‟ names are not important for the selection of an 
alternative. So there‟s assignation of power to an individual or group of individuals 
which is essential for democracy.  
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2.2.7 Neutrality 
This condition implies if x is the outcome of a social choice function and when the 
alternatives in 𝑋 are permutated then the outcome of this social choice function 
should be the permutation of alternative 𝑥. This condition guarantees that the social 
choice does not operate favoring a specific one or a group of alternatives.  
2.2.8 Consistency  
This condition implies, if the preference profile is divided into two parts and 
furthermore if the social choice function that operates on these two separate parts 
picks the same alternative, the same social choice function should also pick the same 
alternative when opposed to the whole preference profile. 
3. VOTING RULES 
According to Riker (1982), voting rules could be classified in terms of kinds of 
information they take from preference profiles. These groups are named; 
Majoritarian Methods; Utilitarian Methods and Positional Methods of voting. These 
methods will be explained briefly in progress. Plurality Rule will be explained in 
detail for being the voting rule used in the experiment.  
3.1 Majoritarian Methods of Voting 
The Majoritarian methods of voting are the extension of simple majority decision 
over two alternatives to three or more alternatives, and they use Condorcet Criterion 
to select a winning candidate. So any voting rule that could be classified as a 
Majoritarian method, selects an alternative as the winner if this alternative beats all 
other alternatives in pairwise comparisons. Formally, let there exists 𝑚 alternatives 
in the set  𝑋, and an alternative 𝑥 ⊂ 𝑋 beats 𝑚 − 1 alternatives in pairwise 
comparisons. Then 𝑥 is the winner of the election and it is clearly the Condorcet 
winner. The pairwise comparisons made according to the number of voters who 
favor an alternative compared to one another candidate. Let‟s illustrate these 
9 
 
comparisons by giving an imaginary example. There are 𝑚 = 3 alternatives and 
𝑛 = 7 voters and let‟s produce an imaginary preference profile. There are 3 voters 
who has a preference relation, 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑧; 3 voters who have a preference relation 
𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑧 ,and 1 voter has a preference relation 𝑧 𝑅𝑖  𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦. To illustrate: 
 
x y z 
y x x 
z z y 
n = 3 n = 3 n = 1 
 
The comparison is made as follows: 
 
Pairwise comparison for 𝑥 𝑣𝑠. 𝑦 
There are four voters who favors  𝑥 more than  𝑦; and three voters who favors 𝑦 more 
than 𝑥. Therefore alternative 𝑥 beats 𝑦 in pairwise comparison. 
Pairwise comparison for 𝑥 𝑣𝑠.  𝑧 
There are six voters who favors  𝑥 more than  𝑧; and one voter who favors 𝑧 more 
than 𝑥. Therefore alternative 𝑥 beats 𝑧 in pairwise comparison. 
Pairwise comparison for 𝑦 𝑣𝑠.  𝑧 
There are six voters who favors 𝑦 more than 𝑧; and one voter who favors 𝑧 more than 
𝑦. Therefore alternative 𝑦 beats 𝑧 in pairwise comparison. 
So, it is clear from the example that alternative 𝑥 beats all other candidates in 
pairwise comparisons. Therefore x is the Condorcet winner and the winner of any 
Majoritarian method of voting. Moreover, beaten by all other alternatives alternative 
𝑧 is the Condorcet loser. 
There‟s been a large number of Majoritarian methods used, and they all produce the 
same result, the Condorcet winner, (except for Runoff) when a Condorcet Winner 
exists. But the difficulty that may arise in the usage of majoritarian methods is, when 
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there exists no Condorcet winner, they fail to elect a winner. In reality, all these 
methods which will be named soon, has a “cure for the sickness” but their “remedy 
leads to a new disease” as Riker (1982) states. The procedure each Majoritarian 
method uses may lead to the selection of a different alternative using the same 
preference profiles. 
These methods involve, the amendment procedure, which is the most widely used 
Majoritarian method (Riker, 1982). Its main motivation is to elect the Condorcet 
winner, if there exists one. Unless it exists, the procedure chooses the status quo, 
which is a major violation of the axiom of neutrality. The social choice function 
works in a way that status quo is favored. The procedure begins initial motion of 
status quo, and then every alternative is put forth, as an opponent for the winning 
candidate in previous competition. If there exists no winner as opposed to other 
alternatives, the procedure elects the status quo. There‟s also a procedure named as 
the successive procedure, which is an analogue for the amendment procedure with 
one distinction. It does not choose status quo if there exists no Condorcet winner in 
the set of alternatives. Another method is known as the Runoff method which 
constitutes plurality –a method which belongs to the positional methods of voting– 
and majoritarian methods.   
3.2 Utilitarian Methods of Voting  
Voting methods that are could be considered under this title use the information of 
how much an alternative is desired. So they are not concerned with the ordering of 
alternatives but their level of attractiveness for a voter. This method involve rules 
such as Summation of Cardinal Utility, in which voters are given chance to evaluate 
alternatives with cardinal utility, which could be interpreted as monetary value; 
Demand-Revealing Methods, which involve agents to offer a “price” to obtain an 
alternative, and the summation of the offered money for an alternative reveals the 
socially favored alternative; and Multiplication of cardinal utilities, which could be 
interpreted as the product version of summation rule. The only favorable issue about 
to product utilities is that it satisfies the consistency axiom.  
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The utilitarian methods have been criticized from many views. The strongest 
criticism is that in the usage of utilitarian methods of voting, voters can overvalue or 
undervalue one or more alternatives to get their favorite alternative elected, or their 
least favored alternative not the get chosen as a social outcome. 
3.3 The Positional Methods of Voting 
These methods consider the information given by ordering of alternatives by voters. 
So positional methods do not take the information about the pairwise comparisons 
and therefore they are not Condorcet consistent. The voting rules that could be 
considered as a Positional method involve Approval Voting, Borda Count, and 
Plurality Rule. The positional methods are the most widely used social choice rules 
around the globe. Many democratic countries use plurality rule in the choice of seats 
in the parliament. Many societies use approval voting, plurality voting, and Borda 
count in the selection of board members. Many more examples in the usage of 
positional methods could be given in many real social choice situations. One of these 
methods, plurality rule, is the voting rule used in our experiment. Therefore, 
positional methods of voting will be explicitly explained in this section.  
3.3.1 Approval voting  
Approval voting offers voters to give one vote for as many candidates as they wish. 
For example if there are ten alternatives in the set of alternatives, and if a voter 
concludes that he/she could approve three alternatives out of ten; he/she expresses 
his/her approval in the form of giving each of these three alternatives three equal 
votes. An example showing the favorable part of approval voting could be given in 
real life situations. Take a liberal voter who favors a liberal alternative in an election, 
if the voting rule is approval voting, he has the chance to give vote to mild 
conservative and mild social democrat a vote, and therefore help (according to 
his/her point of view) avoiding an extremist alternative. As Riker (1982), states that 
approval voting is somewhere between plurality voting and Borda count, and it has a 
growing reputation. Some societies are using approval voting in the election of board 
members; and Vatican uses it for the selection of the Pope.  
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However as all positional methods do, approval voting cannot guarantee the selection 
of the Condorcet winner, moreover it may even fail to elect a strong majority winner. 
Consider the following example in which 𝑚 = 3 and 𝑛 = 10. Further, assume that 
each voter gives two approval votes for their two most favored alternative, and last, 
let‟s take an imaginary profile as follows:  
x z 
y y 
z x 
n = 9 n = 1 
The alternative 𝑥 is clearly the Condorcet winner, moreover it is the strong majority 
winner, he/she is the most favored candidate for more than half of the voters, but if 
we take the assumption that each voter gives two approval votes for their two most 
favored candidates. Then the election result is as follows: the alternative 𝑥 has nine 
approval votes, the alternative 𝑧 has one approval vote, and the alternative 𝑦 has ten 
approval votes, and therefore 𝑦 is the winner of the election. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that; this restriction is very strict, that it only illustrates exactly one 
possible message profile out of many possible massage profiles that could be 
generated according to approval voting. 
3.3.2 Borda Count 
The Borda count is suggested by Borda (1784), as a solution for the example he has 
given, which involves the election of a Condorcet loser when Plurality rule is used. 
Gehrlein (2006) quotes the example which was originally given by Borda (1784), 
which is given as follows: There are 𝑛 = 21 voters, and 𝑚 = 3 alternatives; out of 
these twenty one voters, one voter has preference relation 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑧; seven voters 
have preference relation 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑧 𝑅𝑖  𝑦; seven voters have preference 
relation 𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑧 𝑅𝑖  𝑥; and six voters have preference relation 𝑧 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑥.  
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x x y z 
y z z y 
z y x x 
n = 1 n = 7 n = 7 n = 6 
 
Plurality rule elects 𝑥 as the winner of the election. However, in pairwise 
comparisons, 𝑦 beats 𝑥 (13 votes opposed to 8 votes); 𝑧 beats 𝑥 (13 votes opposed to 
8 votes); and 𝑧 beats 𝑦 (13 votes opposed to 8 votes). Therefore, alternative 𝑧 is 
clearly the Condorcet winner. Moreover, alternative 𝑥, which is beaten by all the 
other alternatives in pairwise comparison, is the Condorcet loser (PMRL). Despite 
being the Condorcet loser, the alternative 𝑥 wins the election, which takes the 
plurality rule as the social choice rule. Gehrlein (2006) states that, Borda was 
primarily concerned with the undesirable result of electing the Condorcet loser as the 
winner. Gehrlein (2006) also states that, Borda suggested, from the view of the 
example, that plurality rule should never be used as a means of a social choice rule 
and further Borda suggested another voting rule, to be a remedy for this undesired, 
electing the Condorcet loser, problem. This remedy is called the Borda Rule which 
involves the voter to assign 𝑚 − 1 points for the most favored candidate, 𝑚 − 2 
points for the second most favored candidate, and continues till he/she assigns zero 
points for the least favored candidate. According to the Borda count, the summation 
of all points that an alternative gets from each voter is the winner of the election. 
Gehrlein (2006) also states that the Borda uses a generalization of scoring rules. 
Borda rule could also be used as non-linear assignation of points for the alternatives. 
Borda suggested this rule as a remedy for the disease; however Borda count does not 
guarantee the selection of a Condorcet winner in an election. It is also a natural result 
because as Riker (1982) implies, as all positional methods do, Borda count is not 
Condorcet consistent. Gehrlein (2006) also states that some writers argue that Borda 
suggested this method for the election of PMRW, however there‟s no argument made 
by Borda that his rule would elect Condorcet winner. As stated earlier by Gehrlein 
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(2006), Borda was primarily concerned with not electing the PMRL; and his method 
guarantees to not have a Condorcet loser as an outcome of an election. Riker (1982) 
further states that usage of Borda rule could be an onerous task if the cardinality of 
the set of alternatives is large.   
3.3.3 Plurality Rule 
While being the voting rule used in our experiment Plurality rule is explained in 
detail in this section. First of all, plurality rule is the most frequently used social 
choice rule to elect some alternative from the set of alternatives. It is very easy to 
implement and its outcomes could be analyzed without an extensive effort. The kind 
of information plurality rule uses is the position of alternatives, as other positional 
methods use. However plurality rule is only interested with the most favored 
alternative of voters. Given the set of alternatives voters only state their most favored 
alternative, and the alternative which has been favored most frequently claims the 
winner position of the election. Just like other positional methods plurality rule does 
not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. Because of being the most frequently used voting 
rule in democratic countries, it should at least satisfy (and it could) unanimity (Pareto 
optimality), and universal admissibility of individual orderings. It may easily be 
proved that plurality rule satisfies these conditions.  
Despite the fact that it is used widely; it has some weaknesses. Giritligil and Sertel 
reports that plurality rule produces the most undesired outcomes, if voters are asked 
their opinion about the winner of an election (2005). The kind of information it takes 
from preference relations of voters‟ results in being the most vulnerable positional 
method that may fail to elect the Condorcet winner. Moreover, as Riker (1982) points 
out, it‟s vulnerable the simplest kind of strategic voting, in which voters who 
supports a weak candidate could vote for a stronger candidate who is also a favored 
candidate (not the most favored). This situation leads the notion known as 
Duverger‟s law, which could be summarized as “The simple majority, single ballot 
system favors the two-party system” (Riker, 1982).  
The selection of an unwanted candidate could also evolve in real-life situations. The 
following example is given by Riker (1982), which illustrates the presidential 
election 1912 in the United States. In this example, there‟s only one Republican 
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candidate and two Democrat candidates. The election result is Wilson (Republican) 
as the winning candidate with 42% of votes; Roosevelt (Democrat) as the second 
with 27% of votes; and Taft (Democrat) as being the last getting the 24% of votes. 
While, it is suggestible that Democrat voters‟ least favored candidate is Wilson, as 
being a conservative and the voters supported Democrat candidates because of 
having political view of a Liberal, Riker (1982) guessed their preference relations 
over the set of these three alternatives. Riker (1982) guesses that 42% has preference 
relation 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛, 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡, 𝑇𝑎𝑓𝑡; 27% has the preference 
relation 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡, 𝑇𝑎𝑓𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛; and 24% has preference 
relation 𝑇𝑎𝑓𝑡, 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛. If pairwise comparisons are checked, the 
situation is as follows: 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡 beats 𝑇𝑎𝑓𝑡 (69% of votes as opposed to 24% of 
votes); 𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡 beats 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛 (51% of votes as opposed to 42% of votes).  𝑇𝑎𝑓𝑡 
beats 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛  (51% of votes as opposed to 42% of votes). As clear from the example  
𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑡 is the Condorcet winner. Moreover, beaten by two other alternatives 
𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑜𝑛 is the Condorcet loser of the election. However, plurality rule picks Wilson 
as the outcome of the election. Another example shown by Riker (1982), illustrates 
another situation which could be interpreted as a Duverger‟s law evolution. The New 
York Senatorial election in 1970 the undesired candidate of both Republicans and 
Democrats, Buckley, won the election. But in the next election, Democrats and 
Republicans compromised and Democrats offered a candidate who could also gain 
Republican support, Moynihan, and Moynihan was the winning candidate.           
4. THE VOTING GAME  
As illustrated in the preliminaries voting rules are the social choice functions that 
select one alternative from the set 𝑋 according to the preferences relations of voters 
in set 𝑁 so it is convenient in this section to show social choice function as 𝑉 instead 
of 𝐹. It is assumed that voters have complete, transitive and binary preferences over 
the set of alternatives 𝑋. The relationship is binary in the sense that if 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, then 
either 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 or 𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑥 should hold. Furthermore, the preference relation is transitive 
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in the sense that if 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑦 and 𝑦 𝑅𝑖  𝑧 then 𝑥 𝑅𝑖  𝑧 should hold for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and for 
all 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋. The preference relationship 𝑅𝑖  states a “at least as good as” 
relationship between alternatives. The 𝑅𝑖  can be broken down into two counterparts. 
As used by Sertel and Sanver (2004), the 𝐼𝑖  part of the preference relation is the 
indifference counterpart; notice that it is also complete and transitive; furthermore it 
is symmetric in the sense that; 𝑥 𝐼𝑖  𝑦 implies 𝑦 𝐼𝑖  𝑥. The indifference means that the 
voter is indifferent between two alternatives. The 𝑃𝑖  counterpart stands for the strict 
counterpart of the preference relation. It is a non-complete, transitive binary relation, 
and it is furthermore asymmetric in the sense that if 𝑥 𝑃𝑖  𝑦, 𝑦 𝑃𝑖  𝑥  could not hold. 
The strict counterpart of the preference relation could be read as “The voter strictly 
prefers an alternative to another alternative”.    
A normal form game is formed by the set of players, the set of strategies and the 
utilities associated with the outcomes, namely the result of the strategies chosen by 
all players. We began with forming the set of players. The players in our game are 
the set of voters, namely the set 𝑁. The utilities associated with outcomes are defined 
by the preference relations of voters. So a generic voter gets the most utility if his/her 
most preferred alternative is the outcome of the election, or game.  
The set of strategies is defined according to the voting rule the society is using. For 
example let  𝑋 = 3, and 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋, for the plurality rule, the strategy space is 
consisted of three strategies. These strategies are “vote for 𝑥”, “vote for 𝑦”, and “vote 
for 𝑧”. If the voting rule is approval voting with the restriction of voting for only two 
alternatives, with the same cardinality and members for set 𝑋, the strategies are “vote 
for 𝑥 and 𝑦”, “vote for 𝑥 and 𝑧”, “vote for 𝑦 and 𝑧”. A further restriction is also made 
theoretically by Sertel and Sanver (2004): Abstaining is not a member of strategy 
space, therefore a voter cannot choose to not to vote. This restriction is also used in 
the experimental design. The strategy space in the voting game is named as the 
message space by Sertel and Sanver (2004) and denoted by 𝑀𝑖 .  
The only remaining part is the utilities associated with the outcomes of the game. 
Sertel and Sanver (2004) states that, the utility that a voter gets from a strategy 
profile 𝑚 is at least as good as 𝑚′ if and only if the outcome (the alternative chosen) 
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of the voting rule under strategy profile 𝑚 is at least as preferred to the one chosen 
under 𝑚′, where 𝑚, 𝑚′ ∈ 𝑀. Formally; 
 
 
𝑢𝑖 𝑚 ≥ 𝑢𝑖 𝑚
′ ⇔ 𝑉 𝑚  𝑅𝑖  𝑉(𝑚
′) 
∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
∀ 𝑚, 𝑚′ ∈ 𝑀 
 
Therefore, any singleton valued voting rule 𝑉: 𝑊𝑁 → 𝐴 with a tie breaking rule 
induces a normal form game 𝛤(𝑉, 𝑅)  =  ({𝑀𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁).  The strong equilibrium 
outcomes are the Nash equilibria of the game Γ, when agents are allowed to 
coordinate and form coalitions. To illustrate the strong equilibrium notion formally; 
𝑚 =  {𝑚𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁 ∈ 𝑀 is a strong equilibrium of the game 𝛤(𝑉, 𝑅)  =  ({𝑀𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁) if 
and only if, given any coalition 𝐾 ⊂ 𝑁, there is no 𝑚′ =  𝑚′ 𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 ∈ 𝑀  with 
𝑚′𝑗 = 𝑚𝑗  for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 \ 𝐾 such that 𝑢𝑖(𝑚′)  >  𝑢𝑖(𝑚) for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝐾 (Sertel and 
Sanver, 2004). 
Let‟s illustrate the strong equilibrium concept with an example taken from Sertel and 
Sanver (2003).  Let  𝑋 = 3 and  𝑁 = 3 and let the preference profile be as follows: 
 
x y z 
y x x 
z z y 
 
And further assume that the voters vote according to the plurality rule under the tie 
breaking rule z beating y and x. Considering any possible coalition contained by the 
set of voters, the joint strategy of “vote for x” is the only joint strategy that make 
voters better off. By the definition of a coalition that it should contain at least two 
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members of a society, this joint strategy makes x the only strong equilibrium 
outcome for this three-person society.    
5. CLASSICAL CONDORCET WINNERS AND GENERALIZED 
CONDORCET WINNERS   
The general notion of a Condorcet Winner, or Pairwise Majority Rule Winner 
(Gehrlein, 2006) is straightforward and named after Marquise de Condorcet while he 
searched tirelessly for a voting rule that guarantees the election of Pairwise Majority 
Rule Winner (Gehrlein, 2006). Under a given preference profile 𝑅 ∈ 𝑊𝑁  the 
Condorcet winner is an alternative which beats all other alternatives in pairwise 
comparisons, and an alternative is said to be a strong Condorcet winner when more 
than 50% of the voters rank this alternative first in their preference orders (Gehrlein 
and Lepelley, 1999).  But in a certain electorate with a preference profile 𝑅 given, 
there may exist no Condorcet winner. This situation is known as the famous 
Condorcet Paradox where voting rules cannot produce an outcome for the election. 
This also would mean that given the assumption transitive (therefore rational) 
individual preferences, there is possibility that voting rule could produce intransitive, 
therefore irrational, ordering of alternatives (Gehrlein, 2006). The Condorcet 
Paradox can be illustrated as follows (Mas-Colell, 1995), let 𝑋 =  𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧  and 
 𝑁 = 3. Further let the preference profile of these three agent society as follows: 
 
x y z 
y z x 
z x y 
 
As observable from the profile, all agents have intransitive preference over the set of 
alternatives. However when one check the pairwise comparisons; alternative x beats 
y (with two against one), y beats z (with two to one), and z beats x (with two to one). 
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Therefore aggregating individual intransitive and consistent preferences produces 
transitive and inconsistent choice of the society as a whole.      
The Notion of Generalized Condorcet Winners relives the restriction on any 
alternative to be regarded as a Condorcet winner. Any element in the set of 
alternatives is said to be a generalized Condorcet winner when any alternative x is 
not dominated by some other alternative 𝑥’ ∈  𝑋/{𝑥}. The domination relation is 
based on Sertel and Sanver (2004). Denoting 𝑛 as the electorate size and 𝑞 as the 
critical value given, with any preference profile 𝑅 ∈  𝑊𝑁  , the domination relation 
for any alternative 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 confronted with any other alternative 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋/ 𝑥  is given as 
follows: 
𝑥 𝐷 𝑅, 𝑛, 𝑞 𝑦  𝑖𝑓𝑓   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁;  𝑥 𝑃𝑖  𝑦  ≥ 𝑞                                                             
If domination relation holds it can be stated that the alternative x (n,q) dominates the 
alternative y according to the profile 𝑅. 
The set of all (n,q) Condorcet Winners according to the given the critical value 𝑞, 
𝐶 𝑅, 𝑛, 𝑞 , is the set of all alternatives that is not dominated by any other alternative. 
For example if the critical value 𝑞 = 0, the set of undominated alternatives is the 
empty set because even if an alternative x is unanimously preferred some other 
alternative y, y still dominates alternative x because of the fact that the number of 
voters who strictly prefer alternative y to alternative x is still weakly greater than 0, 
formally   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁;  𝑥 𝑃𝑖   𝑦  ≥ 0. For the critical value 𝑞 = 1, the set of undominated 
alternatives contains the alternative which is unanimously most preferred alternative 
by all voters, if there exists such an alternative. Because if even one voter prefers 
another alternative y, then    𝑖 ∈ 𝑁;  𝑥 𝑃𝑖   𝑦  ≥ 1; and   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁;  𝑦 𝑃𝑖  𝑥  ≥ 1, 
resulting in leaving no alternative (pairwisely speaking) undominated. A further 
example may be given with 𝑞 = 𝑛. In this case the set of undominated alternatives 
contains all alternatives but one, the one alternative which is anonymously preferred 
as the least alternative by all voters following the same logic presented with the 
𝑞 = 1 case.  Finally, if 𝑞 = 𝑛 + 1 the set of undominated alternatives contains all 
alternatives in 𝑋, because every alternative, even an anonymously least preferred 
alternative, can survive the dominance relation   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁;  𝑥 𝑃𝑖  𝑦  ≥ 𝑛 + 1. 
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Furthermore let  𝑛 ∗∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑞 ∈  0,1,2, . . 𝑛 : 𝑞 > 𝑛 − 𝑞 , then the set of 
generalized Condorcet winners coincides with pairwise majority rule winners or 
“The Classical Condorcet winners” with the critical value 𝑞 = 𝑛 ∗∗ . The critical 
value could be any integer in the interval  0, 𝑛 + 1 . The (n,q) Condorcet winners, or 
the set of undominated alternatives according to the critical value 𝑞, also coincides 
with the Kramer‟s Rule winners (Sertel and Sanver, 2004). The Kramer Rule 
basically states that if there exists no Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives, then 
the alternative which beats more alternatives compared to others wins the election. In 
the context of generalized Condorcet winners, the election result should be the 
alternative which stands undominated by any other alternative for the maximum 
value of the critical value 𝑞 possible.  
5.1 Beta Effectivity and Strong Equilibrium Outcomes 
To prove the relation between strong equilibrium outcomes and generalized 
Condorcet winners Sertel and Sanver (2004) followed the notion of “beta 
effectivity”, which is quoted from Moulin and Peleg (1982). Under a given voting 
rule a coalition K of voters in the electorate is considered as a beta effective coalition 
for any alternative x if and only if, given any preference profile of voters who does 
not belong to that coalition, the coalition K enables x to be chosen under the given 
voting rule. Formally, 
𝐾 ∈ 𝛽𝑉
+ 𝑥  ⇔ 𝑉 𝑅𝐾 , 𝑅𝑁∖𝐾 = 𝑥 
∀ 𝑅𝑁 𝐾  ∈  𝑊
𝑁  
𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒;  
𝐾 ⊆ 𝑁  
𝛽𝑉
+ 𝑥  is the set of all beta effective coalitions under the voting rule V and 𝑏𝑉
+ 𝑥  is 
the minimum possible number of voters K in 𝛽𝑉
+ 𝑥 . And finally 𝑏𝑉
+ is the maximum 
number of  𝑏𝑉
+ 𝑥  considering all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
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There‟s one further definition for beta effectivity named “weak beta effectivity” for 
the proof. Under a given voting rule a coalition K of voters in the electorate is 
considered as weakly beta effective for any alternative x if and only if, given that 
there exists some confronting coalition with some other alternative 𝑦 ≠ 𝑥 is the top 
preference of every voter in that confronting coalition, coalition K enables x to be 
chosen under the voting rule given. Formally; 
𝐾 ∈ 𝛽𝑉
− 𝑥  ⇔ 𝑉 𝑅𝐾 , 𝑅𝑁∖𝐾 = 𝑥; 
𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒; 
∃ 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 ∖  𝑥  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁∖𝐾; 
𝐾 ⊆ 𝑁  
𝛽𝑉
− 𝑥  is the set of all weakly beta effective coalitions under the voting rule V and 
𝑏𝑉
− 𝑥  is the minimum possible number of voters K in 𝛽𝑉
− 𝑥 . And finally 𝑏𝑉
− is the 
minimum number of  𝑏𝑉
− 𝑥  considering all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
Given that 𝑉𝜎(𝑅) constitutes the set of strong equilibrium outcomes according to the 
voting rule V and the preference profile 𝑅. It is possible now to define the relation 
between strong equilibrium outcomes and generalized Condorcet winners. The 
following theorems and lemma are given and proved by Sertel and Sanver (2004). 
The proofs are not included here but can be found in detail in Sertel and Sanver 
(2004). We are only interested in the cases where n is odd. Therefore the theorems 
given are only valid when the electorate size equals an odd integer greater than one.  
Theorem 5.1.  Let V be a unanimous voting rule, then ∀ 𝑅 ∈  𝑊𝑁; 𝐶 𝑅; 𝑛, 𝑞 ⊆
𝑉𝜎 𝑅  for the critical value  𝑞 = 𝑏𝑣
−.  
Theorem 5.2. Let V be an anonymous voting rule, then ∀ 𝑅 ∈  𝑊𝑁; 𝐶 𝑅; 𝑛, 𝑞 ⊇
𝑉𝜎 𝑅  for the critical value 𝑞 = 𝑏𝑣
+. 
Lemma 5.1. Let V be a top-majoritarian and anonymous voting rule, then ∀ 𝑅 ∈
 𝑊𝑁  value 𝑛 ∗∗ = 𝑏𝑣
− = 𝑏𝑣
+. 
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The lemma above enables the set of strong equilibrium outcomes be exactly equal to 
the set of generalized Condorcet winners with the critical value 𝑞 = 𝑛 ∗∗. As given 
above for  𝑞 = 𝑛 ∗∗, the set of generalized Condorcet winners, 𝐶(𝑅, 𝑛, 𝑛 ∗∗), 
coincides with the generalized Condorcet winners in the classical sense. Hence, 
thanks to Sertel and Sanver (2004), we can state that, when n is odd, strong 
equilibrium outcomes of the normal form game, induced by any top-majoritarian and 
anonymous voting rule, is identical with the Condorcet winners in the classical sense. 
Formally, 
𝑉𝜎 𝑅 = 𝐶 𝑅, 𝑛, 𝑛 ∗∗  
∀ 𝑅 ∈ 𝑊𝑁   
6. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
There are two main motivations for this experimental study. First motivation is to 
detect if the repeated elections could act as a coordination device for voters to form 
coalitions, when the results of the repeated elections are announced to the public. 
Second motivation is to detect the effect of the cardinality of voters and the 
treatments for the affectivity on this coordinating device.  
To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study which aims to analyze the role 
of repeated elections as a signaling device with a new payment scheme whose details 
are presented below. First of all, a different pay-off scheme compared to most 
experimental studies designed in the literature before is used, which is explained in 
detail in the following part. Moreover, our experimental design extends the analysis 
of strong equilibrium winners when electorate gets larger. From the results of the 
experiment, one can observe the effectiveness of signaling device, namely repeated 
elections, when a large society votes at the same time. 
As explained in detail in preceding sections Sertel and Sanver (2004) showed that the 
outcome of any non-cooperative voting game induced by any top-majoritarian and 
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anonymous voting rule, are the generalized Condorcet winners, if the agents are 
allowed to coordinate before the game and form coalitions. Moreover if the 
cardinality of the set of voters is odd then the set of generalized Condorcet winners 
coincide with Condorcet winners in the classical sense. There are experimental 
studies, and real life observations supporting the hypothesis that repeated elections 
act as a coordination device. Therefore, it may be expected to observe strong 
equilibrium outcomes in the repeated elections in which results of each election 
made public. One may also realize that coordination becomes harder as the electorate 
size gets larger. Hence for large electorate sizes the observation of strong equilibrium 
outcomes and persistence on these outcomes may require more periods or they may 
never arise at all.        
In the experimental design, three distinct treatments are used. Treatments in an 
experimental design are the specific ways that variables are handled in the 
experiment. There are three different treatments used in the experimental study. In 
the first treatment, there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of candidates X; and 
plurality rule is successful in electing the Condorcet winner. In the second treatment 
the setting is a situation in which a Condorcet winner exists in the set of alternatives, 
however plurality rule fails to elect the Condorcet winner. In the last treatment 
there‟s no Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives.  
Thanks to Egecioglu and Giritligil (2004), we deduce that the smallest possible 
electorate size with three alternatives to impose all the treatments used is seven. 
Therefore, the preference profiles for seven voters and three alternatives are chosen 
for the experiment. The preference profiles are drawn using GenerateRoot[m;n] 
Mathematica function written by Egecioglu (2004). First a hundred profiles are 
generated, secondly out of these a hundred profiles, a profile is randomly drawn 
again and checked if this profile belongs to one of our treatments. The profiles that 
contain strong majority winners (The alternative that gets first-place votes from more 
than half of the electorate) are excluded. Note that if there is a strong majority winner 
in a preference profile, then Plurality and Condorcet both choose that alternative. 
Hence, one cannot impose the restriction of treatment two (Condorcet winner does 
not coincide with plurality winner) or treatment three (There exists no Condorcet 
winner according to given profile). For treatment one, although the restriction is 
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fulfilled, the situation would not be interesting from the point of signaling and 
coordination because of the existence of such a “Strong” winner. In order to check 
robustness of the results, each treatment is repeated with two distinct preference 
structures (roots) each with two different electorate sizes, satisfying the very same 
condition of the treatment. So at the end of this process we have two profiles 
(Coming from different roots but identical from the view of our treatments) for each 
three treatments. 
When the electorate size becomes larger it is impossible to keep preference profiles 
identical, with using the same process explained in preceding paragraph. Therefore a 
simple method is used to obtain preference profiles for 𝑚 = 3 and 𝑛 = 21. The 
preference profiles used in the second sub-treatment consists of 21 subjects, and the 
preference profile of these subjects will be a replicated version of the profile used for 
7 subjects. The replication is straightforward. Each unique preference relation 𝑅𝑖  is 
multiplied by three. For instance if there are three subjects who has identical 
preference relation over the set of alternatives for the sub-treatment in which 𝑚 = 3 
and 𝑛 = 7; for 𝑛 = 21 there are  9 voters who has the same preference relation over 
the set of alternatives.  
The subjects in the experiment are students from Bilgi University and Istanbul 
Technical University, who at the time were taking Microeconomics Classes. The 
reason behind using these subjects is that, they are not broadly informed about game 
theory, but they are at least familiar with notions like utility maximization. 
Furthermore, because of the discipline they are taking, they are supposed to be 
interested in the subject. As mentioned above the experiment took place in two 
different universities. In Bilgi University there is one cohort which contains thirty 
five participants, in Istanbul Technical University there are two cohorts; one 
including seven, while the other includes twenty one participants. For practical 
reasons, the cohort in Bilgi University is labeled as “cohort one”; and the two cohorts 
in Istanbul Technical University are labeled as “cohort two” and “cohort three” 
respectively.  
In cohort one, there are five voting groups, each containing seven subjects. These 
five groups constitute the observations for the three treatments. In each group 
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identical elections take place at the same time, however these elections are 
independent from each other, which mean that any result of any election in one group 
does not affect the results or elections in other groups. To minimize the interaction 
between voting groups, the names of the alternatives are permutated. Therefore, in 
each five groups the preference profiles are the same with the exception that the 
names of the three alternatives are different. Moreover, in cohort one, each group and 
each individual voter is given and ID name and number respectively.  The groups are 
named as Group A, Group B, Group C, Group D, and Group E. And each individual 
in each group is given numbers between one and seven. 
In cohort two, the structure is exactly the same with the one explained above. This 
group is just formed to enlarge the observations used in the experiment.   
In cohort three, there is one group of twenty one voters. As explained, the preference 
relations used in this cohort is just the replicated version of the ones used in groups 
with seven subjects. So in cohort three only one election takes place and all members 
of the group vote for that election. 
Before the arrival of the subjects the sheet of instructions are placed on the seats. 
After the subjects are seated according to the voting groups (The subjects are free to 
choose where to sit but the place for all groups were assigned before), and after they 
read the instructions, the instructions are also read aloud and it is made sure that 
every subject understood the process of the experiment clearly. In the beginning of 
each treatment the subjects are given folders designed for this very treatment and 
related ID number. These folders contain voting ballots in which subjects are able to 
write their preference. Apart from the folders, in the beginning of each treatment, the 
subjects are also given preference relations that they use throughout the treatment. As 
stated earlier each treatment contains a number of repeated elections. When, subjects 
finished voting, voting ballots are collected and counted. And, the result of the 
election is announced to the voting group. In cohort one, because of the large number 
of total participants in one class and five different elections taking place at the same 
time each group is assigned a member of the experiment staff and this person made 
announcements verbally. In cohort two and three the announcements are made via 
writing the number of votes on the blackboard. After that announcement subjects are 
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asked to vote again. When convergence or divergence, which is explained later, is 
observed, repeated elections and that treatment end. The pay-off each subject gets is 
evaluated according to the last repeated election and noted.    
The voting groups do not change throughout the experiment. According to that 
manner all six treatments are implemented at the same voting group throughout the 
experiment. This means that each subject votes in six separate elections, and in a 
number of repeated elections.  Totally, there are thirty elections in cohort one, six 
elections in cohort two and cohort three.  
The information structure is simple. Before the experiment, each preference relation 
in the preference profile is assigned to each subject and each subject is only given 
his/her preference relation over the set of alternatives X. So preference relation of a 
specific agent is private information, and this information is symmetric among 
voters. The voters are also given their pay off scheme designed according to their 
preference on set X and the outcome of the series of repeated elections. After a single 
election the result of the election and the number of votes each alternative received, 
is made public and the voters are asked to vote again. Therefore, it is made possible 
for the voters to get insights of the electorate more and more after each election. 
Furthermore, the participants are strictly warned to not to share preference relations 
or filled ballots with other participants. To keep the information structure symmetric 
and personal.  
The basic motivation for the pay-off scheme used is, to make the preferences ordinal. 
The pay-off scheme is as follows. If the agent‟s most preferred candidate wins after a 
series of repeated elections or when the convergence is observed he/she gets a pay-
off π. If the agent‟s least preferred candidate wins after this process he/she gets zero 
pay-off. If the voter‟s secondly preferred candidate wins after the process he/she gets 
a pay off π‟, where π‟= λπ, and λ is a random coefficient drawn from a uniform 
distribution from the weak interval (0,1). It is well-known that utility is not cardinal, 
except for the situations in which agents get monetary pay-offs like profit, wage, etc. 
In consumer theory utility is ordinal and cannot be measured. The uncertainty of the 
pay-off given in the case of the social selection of the second candidate enables 
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ordinality, therefore we can assure us that there is no bias in the selection of a 
candidate resulted from the cardinal difference of pay-offs offered to the voters.  
After an election is over the results, which consists of the distribution of votes, are 
announced to the electorate and they are asked to vote again for the next election. 
The distribution of votes is given in consistency with the voting rule, which is the 
plurality rule. So the announcement will be in the form of the number of first-place 
votes each agent receives.  
The size of the electorate is selected to be as equal to an odd numbers, therefore it is 
made possible that the set of strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting game equals 
to the set of generalized Condorcet winners. The results are stored at the end of each 
election, in order to observe convergence and divergence there had to be a close 
screening by the experiment staff.  
The number of repeated elections in a session is not pre-determined. In each of these 
elections, the experiment staff is in the search of a convergence or divergence. The 
identification method of convergence and divergence is as follows. During a series of 
repeated elections, the convergence is reached when two replicate distributions of 
votes among the alternatives are observed respectively and this situation is labeled as 
a “convergence” and the election ends. If two duplicate voting distribution are 
observed not consequently but after a number of elections, it is identified as a 
divergence. A divergence also means an end for that specific round of election. 
As we stated earlier, there are three different treatments included in this study. The 
first possible situation could emerge when there exists a Condorcet winner according 
to the preference profile, and according to the profile, the plurality rule should elect 
Condorcet winner, if the voters vote their preferences sincerely.  The second possible 
situation is the case where the preference profile gives rise to a Condorcet winner; 
however the plurality rule does not elect the Condorcet winner. The last possible 
scenario is the case where the preference profile does not have a Condorcet Winner. 
The profiles produced by the process explained before, is shown below. Notice that 
profiles produces the same results, however they are coming from different root 
profiles, and practically speaking they cannot be produced from each other via 
permutation of voters and alternatives (Egecioglu and Giritligil, 2004). As mentioned 
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above, the names of the alternatives are permutated in the experiment to eliminate 
the interaction between voting groups. 
i) Plurality winner ≠ Condorcet winner 
First Profile 
 
y y z z x x x 
z z x y y z z 
x x y x z y y 
  
x is the Plurality Winner. 
 
Pairwise Comparisons: 
x vs y: 4 – 3  
x vs z: 3 – 4 
z vs y: 4 – 3 
 
z is the Condorcet winner. 
 
Second Profile  
 
x x y z z x z 
y y z y y y y 
z z x x x z x 
 
 
x is the plurality winner (according to the tie breaking rule: alphabetic 
order) 
 
Pairwise Comparisons: 
x vs y: 3 – 4 
x vs z: 3 – 4 
y vs z: 4 – 3 
 
y is the Condorcet winner. 
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ii) Plurality winner = Condorcet winner 
 
First Profile  
 
y x x y y z z 
z z y x x y y 
x y z z z x x 
 
 
y is the Plurality winner. 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
x vs y: 2 – 5 
x vs z: 4 – 3 
y vs z: 4 – 3 
 
y is the Condorcet winner. 
 
Second Profile 
 
y x y z y z z 
z y z y z y y 
x z x x x x x 
 
y is the plurality winner (According to tie breaking rule: alphabetic order)  
 
Pairwise Comparisons: 
x vs y: 1 – 6 
x vs z: 1 – 6 
y vs z: 4 – 3 
 
y is the Condorcet winner. 
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iii) There exists no Condorcet winner 
 
First Profile 
 
y y x x y z z 
z x y y z x x 
x z z z x y y 
 
y is the plurality winner. 
 
Pairwise Comparisons  
x vs y: 4 – 3 
x vs z: 3 – 4 
y vs z: 5 – 2 
No Condorcet winner. 
 
Second Profile 
 
z y x x x z z 
y x y z z y y 
x z z y y x x 
 
x is the plurality winner. 
 
Pairwise Comparisons 
x vs y: 3 – 4 
x vs z: 4 – 3 
y vs z: 2 – 5 
 
No Condorcet winner. 
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7. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS  
The data containing group voting behavior are given in the appendix. It is useful to 
divide the participants into two major groups. The first group is consisted seven 
voters. The number of observations is six for this group. The second group includes 
twenty one voters. The number of observations, due to participant, time and budget 
constraints, is only one for this group. Firstly, the analysis for individual groups is 
presented, and then between groups analysis is presented.  
In this section the major properties of data according to the structure of the profile is 
presented. There exist three treatments with each one containing two duplicate 
profiles. The tables below represent data for each treatment. 
Table 7.1 The Results of Treatment One  
Group 
Number of 
Participants 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
1) 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
2) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 1) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 2) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 
1) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 
2) 
A 7 NC C 7 2 Con. Con. 
B 7 NC C 3 3 Con. Con. 
C 7 NC C 5 3 Con. Con. 
D 7 NC C 3 4 Con. Con. 
E 7 C C 3 3 Div. Div. 
F 7 C C 5 2 Con. Con. 
G 21 C C 4 5 Con. Con. 
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Table 7.2 The Results of Treatment Two 
Group 
Number of 
Participants 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
1) 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
2) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 1) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 2) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 1) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 2) 
A 7 NC NC 7 2 Con. Con. 
B 7 NC C 4 3 Con. Div. 
C 7 C C 3 4 Con. Con. 
D 7 C C 4 4 Con. Con. 
E 7 NC NC 2 3 Con. Con. 
F 7 C C 4 4 Con. Con. 
G 21 C NC 8 3 Con. Con. 
 
Table 7.3 The Results of Treatment Three 
Group 
Number of 
Participants 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
1) 
Winner 
of the 
election 
(Root 
2) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 1) 
Number 
of 
Repeated 
Elections 
(Root 2) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 1) 
Reason 
for 
Ending 
Election 
(Root 
2) 
A 7 - - 5 2 Div. Con. 
B 7 - - 5 5 Div. Con. 
C 7 - - 5 6 Div. Con. 
D 7 - - 8 2 Con. Con. 
E 7 - - 4 5 Con. Div. 
F 7 - - 2 2 Con. Con. 
G 21 - - 4 5 Con. Div. 
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Figure 7.1 The Winner of the Elections in Treatment One According to Roots (n=7) 
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Figure 7.2. The Winner of the Elections in Treatment Two According to Roots (n=7) 
The results of the first two treatments are as demonstrated above. In the first 
treatment, it is observable that, despite the fact that the two roots are identical, the 
behaviors of the voters in the same group are very different. This may be due to the 
confusion of the participants. The root one of the first treatment is the first election of 
the experiment, and there could be some misunderstanding about the experiment. 
Furthermore, first five groups (A-E) are from Bilgi University, in which the 
experiment took place in a very large class. This strengthens the possibility that in 
the first election, the situation could not be understood by the participants.   This is 
solved in proceeding elections via the help of the experiment staff. Excluding the 
results for the first five groups, it is concrete that all groups selected Condorcet 
Winner as the winner of the election and moreover all elections except for group E 
ended with a convergence. So it could be stated that strong equilibrium outcome of 
the voting game are reached in these groups, and the repeated elections are effective 
as a coordination device. In the group with twenty-one participants, it is also evident 
that strong equilibrium is reached in both two roots. In the first treatment while all 
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equilibrium outcomes are strong equilibrium outcomes, there exists no need for 
searching deeper for other winners.  
In the second treatment, participants have become familiar with the experiment. 
Therefore there is no need for excluding any observations. In the second treatment, 
while there exists a Condorcet winner, Plurality rule fails to elect this winner 
according to given profiles, because as stated before the Plurality rule takes only a 
constraint amount of information from preference relations‟ of voters on account. 
However, as Sertel and Sanver (2004) stated, no matter what the outcome of the 
voting rule used is, if there exists some kind of perfect coordination between voters, 
the strong equilibrium outcome should hold, while the Plurality rule is not only top-
majoritarian but also anonymous, and therefore fulfills the assumptions for the strong 
equilibrium outcomes be equal to the set of generalized Condorcet winners. In 
practice repeated elections is not a “perfect” way of coordinating. But it gives very 
important information, if the distribution of votes according to alternatives is made 
public. In second treatment it is evident that the Condorcet winner is elected in seven 
times out of twelve elections, this can be evaluated as the “imperfect” nature of 
information given by the coordination device in our research. It is also worth 
searching the qualification of winners in remaining five elections. According to the 
data the winner of the all five elections are plurality winner and never the Condorcet 
loser, therefore it could be stated that the coordination device is at least performs 
accurately. Otherwise, the winner of the all elections should be the plurality winner. 
With the treatment in which Plurality winner and Condorcet winner do not coincide, 
we can conclude that repeated elections serve as an imperfect coordination device. 
Furthermore, the selection of the plurality winner but not the Condorcet winner 
usually arise in preference profiles in which the plurality winner has three votes, 
while the other two alternatives has two votes each. This situation results in “sticky” 
repeated elections. It seems no side could differentiate which alternative is strong 
confronted with the other. Therefore they usually hold on to their first-place 
alternatives, and election ends with the selection of the plurality winner. The nature 
of politics is also a good clue for this situation. When alternative parties, which 
espouses very close political views, and have almost equal vote potentials, even the 
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politicians in those parties are reluctant to collude, resulting in the plurality winner to 
win the election.  
In treatment three due to lack of existence of a Condorcet winner it is not possible to 
differentiate between winners as “the Condorcet winner” and “Not the Condorcet 
winner”; however we can check if the winner possesses any evident specification. In 
most of the cases the winner is the plurality winner. However in some elections the 
winner of the election is not the plurality winner but the alternative having a strong 
majority of second-place votes. One explanation may be given with risk aversive 
behavior of voters, while in these profiles there is no strong standing of an 
alternative, some voters might have chosen their second-best alternative 
straightforwardly.    
A further question of our experimental design is if the electorate could find an 
equilibrium point when there is no Condorcet winner in the alternatives set according 
to the preference profile given. The equilibrium points are identified as a 
convergence in our design. And when a divergence is observed it is interpreted as 
“the electorate could not find an equilibrium point”. If one can observe from table 
7.1, 7.2, and 7.3; divergences are most frequent in the treatment three in which there 
exists no Condorcet winner. The occurrences of divergences are illustrated below 
(Including observations with twenty one participants). It is evident that almost half of 
the elections in treatment three ended with a divergence, which could hardly be 
interpreted as a result of the chance mechanism. It is very natural to observe this 
outcome, because, thanks to Sertel and Sanver (2004), we know that when the set of 
Condorcet winners is empty it means that the set of strong equilibrium outcomes is 
also empty.   
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Figure 7.3 The Occurrence of Divergence according to treatments.   
It would be also interesting to check if there exists a difference between the number 
of rounds that each treatment take. In practice, it is possible to expect a faster reach 
for equilibrium for the treatment in which the Plurality winner and the Condorcet 
winner coincide. However, due to fluctuating voting distributions of repeated 
elections one could expect a longer number of repeated elections when there exists 
no Condorcet winner (treatment three) and due to strong position of their first-place 
alternative (because of this alternative is the plurality winner), some voters may be 
reluctant to pass to their second-place alternative and therefore repeated elections 
may be also larger in number for treatment two. Below, the descriptive statistics of 
the number of rounds that each treatment took is shown (for n=7 groups).  
Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics of Number of Rounds According to Treatments 
Variable      Treatment   N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  
Median 
No of Round   T1          6   6  2,833    0,307  0,753    2,000  2,000   
3,000 
              T2         12   0  3,667    0,376  1,303    2,000  3,000   
4,000 
              T3         12   0  4,250    0,552  1,913    2,000  2,000   
5,000 
 
Variable      Treatment     Q3  Maximum 
No of Rounds  T1         3,250    4,000 
              T2         4,000    7,000 
              T3         5,000    8,000 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Divergence
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Figure 7.4 Individual Value Plot of Number of Rounds. 
The data shows that, the elections in treatment three lasted more in number of 
rounds, for the equilibrium or disequilibrium to evolve, generally speaking. 
However, the data also reveals that the variation in number of rounds becomes larger 
moving from treatment one to treatment three. One reason for that observation is the 
“sticky” voting distributions as mentioned above. The fewer votes the Plurality loser 
(The alternative who gets the fewest number of votes) gets, the less the “sticky” 
voting distributions are observed. Moreover, the 3-2-2; or 9-6-6 distribution is more 
frequent in treatment three, because of the nature of the kind of the preference 
profile. Whenever this stickiness is overcome, it is evident that it took at least four 
rounds to end an election in treatment three. Moreover, while seeming disparate, in 
treatment two, the mode of number of rounds is four, and treatment two has a higher 
median and arithmetic mean confronted with treatment one. This situation may 
evolve when some of the voters in the electorate, who has Condorcet winner as the 
second best alternative, are reluctant to change his or her vote. However in treatment 
one plurality winner has a concrete support, due to usually being second best-choice 
of the voters who has a different alternative as the first-best choice. Despite the fact 
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that there are too few observations, checking the difference between number of 
rounds according to treatments would be useful (The statistical tests used are taken 
from Newbold (1995) and Siegel (1956)).  
To begin with, one way ANOVA is used to test the significance of difference 
between number of repeated elections. While there are missing values in the data due 
to exclusion of data in the first root of the first treatment, one cannot use two-way 
ANOVA. That‟s why each election is considered as an independent observation.  
Table 7.5 One-Way ANOVA Test for the Difference in Number of Elections 
Source     DF     SS    MS     F      P 
Treatment   2   8,12  4,06  1,77  0,189 
Error      27  61,75  2,29 
Total      29  69,87 
 
S = 1,512   R-Sq = 11,62%   R-Sq(adj) = 5,07% 
 
 
 
                         Individual 80% CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev 
Level   N   Mean  StDev  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
T1      6  2,833  0,753  (---------*----------) 
T2     12  3,667  1,303                (------*------) 
T3     12  4,250  1,913                       (------*------) 
                         -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                            2,40      3,20      4,00      4,80 
 
Pooled StDev = 1,512 
 
The results and difference is significant at 80% confidence level. At this confidence 
level, it could be stated that the mean of number of repeated election is significantly 
higher for treatment three in which there exists no Condorcet winner in the 
alternatives set than treatment one in which plurality and Condorcet winners are the 
same. However, the ANOVA requires normality in each treatment and equality of 
variance between these treatments (Newbold, 1995). The number of observations is 
very low to state the normality the data, furthermore the variances seem unequal. But 
as stated above, due to few numbers of observations, the statistical tests are used only 
for practical purposes.   
While ANOVA requires normality and equality of variances, a non-parametric test 
could be used. As Newbold (1995) states that non-parametric tests require no 
distributional assumption for the population. Taking each election result independent 
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again, one can use a Kruskal-Wallis test to see if there exists a difference between 
treatments without making a further assumption. 
Table 7.6 Kruskal-Wallis Test on No of Rounds 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on No of Rounds 
Treatment   N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
T1          6   3,000      10,3  -1,61 
T2         12   4,000      15,3  -0,11 
T3         12   5,000      18,3   1,42 
Overall    30              15,5 
 
H = 3,28  DF = 2  P = 0,194 
H = 3,45  DF = 2  P = 0,178  (adjusted for ties) 
 
It is evident that Kruskal- Wallis test produced very similar results with one-way 
ANOVA. One can only reject the null hypothesis stating that there exists no 
significant difference for number of elections between the treatments at 20% 
significance level.  
However, as stated when the number of votes each alternative takes was very close, 
“sticky” voting distributions is observed no matter what the characteristic of the 
treatment was. Therefore a further analysis is performed below. All observations 
ending with a convergence in two rounds of elections are excluded from the data and 
Kruskal-Wallis test is performed again.   
Table 7.7 Kruskal-Wallis Test on No of Rounds (Constrained) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on No of Rounds 
 
Treatment   N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
T1          4   3,000       5,3  -2,13 
T2         10   4,000       9,5  -1,35 
T3          8   5,000      17,2   3,11 
Overall    22              11,5 
 
H = 10,84  DF = 2  P = 0,004 
H = 11,76  DF = 2  P = 0,003  (adjusted for ties) 
 
Excluding elections ended with two repeated elections, the difference is very strong 
now.  The average rank of the number of rounds for treatment three is significantly 
higher from the overall average rank, and the average rank of the number of rounds 
for treatment one is significantly lower than the overall average rank. Therefore one 
can state that, excluding “sticky” voting distributions, the elections lasted longer 
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when there is no Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives according to the profile 
given (With, of course, assumptions made about the usage of the test).  
A Friedman two-way variance test with ranks is also used. However, this test 
requires no missing data and designed for dependent samples (Siegel, 1956). 
Therefore whole elections with root one are excluded from the data. In our case these 
dependent samples are the voting groups.    
Table 7.8 Friedman’s Two-Way Variance Test with Ranks 
S = 1,08  DF = 2  P = 0,582 
S = 1,63  DF = 2  P = 0,444 (adjusted for ties) 
 
Treatment  N  Est Median  Sum of Ranks 
T1         6      3,0000   10,0 
T2         6      3,0000   12,5 
T3         6      4,0000   13,5 
 
Grand median = 3,3333 
 
Friedman test produces insignificant results and is very different from ANOVA and 
Kruskal-Wallis test. It is mostly because of the Friedman test allows no missing 
observations. Therefore the five observations for groups are also removed and the 
test produced very different results from ANOVA analysis. Moreover, while it leads 
to the problem of missing values one cannot exclude the elections with “sticky” 
voting distributions.  
As stated above we have only one observation for the case the electorate is consisted 
of twenty-one participants. Therefore, six elections took place with the twenty-one-
participant electorate. According to data; there existed no difference for the 
equilibrium outcomes, compared to the case with seven participants. In the treatment 
in which plurality winner and Condorcet winner coincide. The winner of the election 
was the Condorcet winner in both two duplicate elections. In the treatment in which 
Plurality winner and Condorcet winner do not coincide the equilibrium outcome was 
the Condorcet winner in one of the two elections. Therefore, the results are very 
similar with the ones with seven participants.  
 
42 
 
Table 7.9 Descriptive Statistics of the Number of Repeated Elections According 
to Groups 
              Group  N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  Median 
No of Rounds  A      5   1  3,600    1,030  2,300    2,000  2,000   2,000 
              B      5   1  4,000    0,447  1,000    3,000  3,000   4,000 
              C      5   1  4,200    0,583  1,304    3,000  3,000   4,000 
              D      5   1  4,400    0,980  2,191    2,000  3,000   4,000 
              E      5   1  3,400    0,510  1,140    2,000  2,500   3,000 
              F      5   1  2,800    0,490  1,095    2,000  2,000   2,000 
              G      6   0  4,833    0,703  1,722    3,000  3,750   4,500 
 
Variable      Group     Q3  Maximum 
No of Rounds  A      6,000    7,000 
              B      5,000    5,000 
              C      5,500    6,000 
              D      6,000    8,000 
              E      4,500    5,000 
              F      4,000    4,000 
              G      5,750    8,000 
 
While there seems no significant evidence that the effectiveness of repeated elections 
differ for the larger electorate, there exist imperfect evidence (due to lack of 
observations) the number of repeated elections differ between these groups. 
According to the table shown above, the number of repeated elections for group G, 
which is consisted of twenty one voters, has the largest mean and median among all 
groups. This difference is of course not significant, due to observation constraint and 
therefore one can only suggest that there exist signs in the data that the elections with 
twenty one participants lasted longer than the ones with seven participants. 
In conclusion, from the experiment results, we can conclude that repeated elections 
acts as a coordination device for the electorate. However, the coordination is more 
concrete and the coordination device is more effective when there exists a Condorcet 
winner in the set of alternatives and the Plurality rule elects this candidate, or in a 
case in which Plurality rule is “Condorcet Efficient”.  In a preference profile in 
which a Condorcet winner exists, but when Plurality rule is not Condorcet efficient; 
the effectiveness of coordination device is rather weaker. This conclusion is reached 
while; the strong equilibrium outcomes are reached only in seven elections out of 
twelve elections, confronted with seven observation of strong equilibrium outcomes 
with the elections when Plurality rule is Condorcet efficient. In profiles with the 
property of the absence of a Condorcet winner, the divergences are more frequent. 
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When there exists no Condorcet winner in a profile, the set of strong equilibrium 
outcomes is empty; for that reason it is natural to observe duplicate voting 
distributions after a series of repeated elections.  
Due to masses of voters in the electorate, it is very hard for the voters to collaborate 
and form coalitions in real life situations. In the experimental study, to catch the 
importance of electorate size in the effectiveness of coordination device, two 
different electorate sizes are used. However, there seem to be no significant change 
in equilibrium outcomes. But with the usage of larger electorates, it is more probable 
to observe this notion. With larger electorates, the gap between first-place votes gets 
larger and for some of the voters the Plurality winner could seem as “impossible to 
penetrate” and they may stick with their first-best choices. 
As shown above, the number of repeated elections seems to be higher for the 
treatment three compared to the ones in treatment one and two. This observation 
strengthens the theoretical expectations. Since, the individual voter is inconclusive 
about the “strength” or vote potential of any alternative in the set of alternatives, 
he/she may have changing and fluctuating choices for each round of repeated 
elections. With the seven-participant electorate size this result is more observable. 
However, mostly, due to lack of observations with twenty one participants this 
conclusion cannot be reached. Also, there exists some evidence that when electorate 
size gets larger, the repeated elections tend to be more in number. While it cannot be 
stated with absolute confidence; for the twenty-one-person-society the number of 
repeated elections has a larger mean and median from the number of repeated 
elections of all individual seven-person-societies. The behavioral reason of this 
situation is, in a small society it is more observable for the voters to analyze the 
voting distributions and guess the “strongest” alternative; however with a larger 
electorate the information may not be adequate for an individual voter to change 
his/her choice. 
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8. FURTHER RESEARCH 
For further research, the same experiment can be repeated with larger electorate 
sizes. Via, it could be more probable to observe the effect of electorate size on the 
observation of strong equilibrium outcomes and number of repeated elections. 
Furthermore, a different information structure could also be used. In the experimental 
design used, the voting distributions are also made public via the announcement of 
the number of votes each alternative gets. An experiment with the announcement of 
only the ordering of alternatives would offer a different and a constrained 
information structure. It would be interesting to search the effect of information 
structure on the observation of the strong equilibrium outcomes and on the number of 
repeated elections.  
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APPENDIX  
Details of Group Voting Behavior 
 
Figure A.1 Group Voting Behavior (Group A) 
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Figure A.2 Group Voting Behavior (Group B) 
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Figure A.3 Group Voting Behavior (Group C) 
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Figure A.4 Group Voting Behavior (Group D) 
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Figure A.5 Group Voting Behavior (Group E) 
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Figure A.6 Group Voting Behavior (Group F) 
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Figure A.7 Group Voting Behavior (Group G) 
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Instructions 
Instructions for n=7 
GENERAL 
The experiment you are about to participate is conducted for an analysis regarding 
voting rules.  
Your participation will provide monetary rewards. The amount of your reward will 
depend on the decision you and people on your group will make.  
If you have any questions after the experiment begins please raise your hand and 
wait for the experiment assistant to come to you. During the experiment all written 
and oral communication is strictly forbidden.  
GROUPS 
You will be assigned to a group of same six people to vote in a series of elections 
throughout the experiment.  
There are five different voter groups in the room: Group A, Group B, Group C, 
Group D and Group E. Elections in different voter groups are independent of other 
elections.  
On each ballot the name of your group (in letter) and your voter ID is written. Your 
group name and voter number will remain constant.  
ELECTIONS, PREFERENCES AND VOTING ROUNDS 
Each group will complete 6 independent election processes. In each election process 
participants will cast votes for several rounds to determine group preference among 
three hypothetical candidates (“x”, “y” and “z”) in accordance with their preference 
order to be given.  
You will be given a preference order illustrating your order of preference among “x”, 
“y” and “z”. i.e: if you are given the order: 
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y 
z 
x 
this represents that your first preference (most favored candidate) is “y”, your second 
preference (less favored candidate) is “z” and your last preference (the candidate you 
do not want to win) is “x”. In other words electing “y” is the best condition while 
electing “z” is second best condition and electing “x” is unwanted condition.  
No one but you will know your order of preference. You are not to share this 
information with other participants.  
Depending on the preference order you are provided with, you are asked to state one 
candidate on one of the ballots you have. After casting your vote please fold the 
ballot and wait silently. After all 7 votes of your group are collected they will be 
counted. By reason of voting round, the votes each candidate polls will be announced 
and noted on the board in their relevant columns and the candidate with the most 
votes will be declared the winner of the round. For example, if “x” got 2 votes, “y” 
got 3 votes and “z” got 2 votes “y” will be the winner of the round. In cases where 
more than one candidates have the most votes the winner will be determined the 
alphabetical order of their letters. 
After the announcement of the results of the rounds you will be asked to cast votes 
again depending on the same order of preference and the above procedures will 
apply. The number of rounds in a voting process will not be announced but after the 
last round it will be announced that the election process has ended. (ATTENTION: 
because the experiments in each voting group are independent of others, each group 
will have its own announcements. Please just follow the announcements of your own 
group.) 
Once an election process has ended the winner of the last round will be announced 
the winner of the election. The position of the winning candidate on your order of 
preference will determine the amount of money you will earn. If the winning 
candidate is the top candidate in your order of preference you will earn $1. If the 
winning candidate is the bottom candidate in your order, you will get no money. If 
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the winning candidate is second in your order of preference a random number 
between 0 and 1 (both 0 and 1 exclusive) will be drawn. That number will determine 
your s. The value of the number to be drawn has equal probability between 0 and 1. 
for example probability of drawing a number close to 1, drawing 1/2, drawing 2/3, 
drawing 1/4 or drawing a number close to 0 have the same probability. 0 and 1 are 
excluded. Thus election of your second preference will absolutely yield less earnings 
than your first preference and absolutely yield more earning than your last 
preference.  
Upon the announcement of the completion of voting tours of an election process a 
new election will commence. The order of preference and new polls for the new 
election will be handled to you. Then voting rounds will commence and above 
process will be repeated. The experiment ends after the completion of 6 election 
processes.  
The total earnings of 6 election processes will be handled to you in cash in a few 
days following the experiment.  
 
Reminder: Elections one voter group is completely irrelevant with the elections of 
other groups. Therefore please follow announcements only related to your group. 
During the experiment each group will conduct 6 independent election processes. 
In the beginning of each election process you will be given orders of preferences 
describing which candidates you prefer. This information is for your eyes only and 
you should not share this with other participants. Each election process consists of 
a number of voting rounds undetermined beforehand. The completion of an 
election process will be determined and announced instantly. What determines 
your earnings is the order of the winning candidate in your order of preference.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions after the experiment starts, please raise your hand and wait 
for the experiment assistant to approach you.  
Now please check the above information and wait for the start of the experiment.  
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Instructions for n=21 
GENERAL 
The experiment you are about to participate is conducted for an analysis regarding 
voting rules.  
Your participation will provide monetary rewards. The amount of your reward will 
depend on the decision you and people on your group will make.  
If you have any questions after the experiment begins please raise your hand and 
wait for the experiment assistant to come to you. During the experiment all written 
and oral communication is strictly forbidden.  
ELECTIONS, PREFERENCES AND VOTING ROUNDS 
You will be assigned to a group of same 20 people to vote in a series of elections 
throughout the experiment. Each group will complete 6 independent election 
processes. In each election process participants will cast votes for several rounds to 
determine group preference among three hypothetical candidates (“x”, “y” and “z”) 
in accordance with their preference order to be given.  
You will be given a preference order illustrating your order of preference among “x”, 
“y” and “z”. I.e: if you are given the order: 
y 
z 
x 
this represents that your first preference (most favored candidate) is “y”, your second 
preference (less favored candidate) is “z” and your last preference (the candidate you 
do not want to win) is “x”. In other words electing “y” is the best condition while 
electing “z” is second best condition and electing “x” is unwanted condition.  
No one but you will know your order of preference. You are not to share this 
information with other participants.  
Depending on the preference order you are provided with, you are asked to state one 
candidate on one of the ballots you have. After casting your vote please fold the 
ballot and wait silently. After all 21 votes of your group are collected they will be 
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counted. By reason of voting round, the votes each candidate polls will be announced 
and noted on the board in their relevant columns and the candidate with the most 
votes will be declared the winner of the round. For example, if “x” got 9 votes, “y” 
got 5 votes and “z” got 7 votes “x” will be the winner of the round. In cases where 
more than one candidate has the most votes the winner will be determined the 
alphabetical order of their letters. 
After the announcement of the results of the rounds you will be asked to cast votes 
again depending on the same order of preference and the above procedures will 
apply. The number of rounds in a voting process will not be announced but after the 
last round it will be announced that the election process has ended.  
Once an election process has ended the winner of the last round will be announced 
the winner of the election. The position of the winning candidate on your order of 
preference will determine the amount of money you will earn. If the winning 
candidate is the top candidate in your order of preference you will earn $1. If the 
winning candidate is the bottom candidate in your order, you will get no money. If 
the winning candidate is second in your order of preference a random number 
between 0 and 1 (both 0 and 1 exclusive) will be drawn. That number will determine 
your s. The value of the number to be drawn has equal probability between 0 and 1. 
for example probability of drawing a number close to 1, drawing 1/2, drawing 2/3, 
drawing 1/4 or drawing a number close to 0 have the same probability. 0 and 1 are 
excluded. Thus election of your second preference will absolutely yield less earnings 
than your first preference and absolutely yield more earnings than your last 
preference.  
Upon the announcement of the completion of voting tours of an election process a 
new election will commence. The order of preference and new polls for the new 
election will be handled to you. Then voting rounds will commence and above 
process will be repeated. The experiment ends after the completion of 6 election 
processes.  
The total earnings of 6 election processes will be handled to you in cash in a few 
days following the experiment.  
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Reminder: During the experiment each group will conduct 6 independent election 
processes. In the beginning of each election process you will be given orders of 
preferences describing which candidates you prefer. This information is for your 
eyes only and you should not share this with other participants. Each election 
process consists of a number of voting rounds undetermined beforehand. The 
completion of an election process will be determined and announced instantly. 
What determines your earnings is the order of the winning candidate in your order 
of preference.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
If you have any questions after the experiment starts, please raise your hand and wait 
for the experiment assistant to approach you.  
Now please check the above information and wait for the start of the experiment. 
Illustrations of a Preference Relation and a Voting Ballot 
 
 
Participant Number: A.1 
           Election Number: 1  
 
Your Preference Ordering is: 
 
y 
z 
x 
 
Ballot 
Participant Number: A.1 
           Election Number: 1  
 
Your Choice is: 
(x or y or z) 
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